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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article considers the development and current state of human
rights in Africa and discusses the concept of human rights in terms of its
historical development to ascertain whether present conceptions of
human rights have universal components. Much of the present philo-
sophical and ideological tenets of human rights, which are reflected or
interpreted in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal
Declaration), are a product of a particular social order and thus reflect a
particular ideology. Traditional African societies had their own concep-
tions of human rights. This Article considers differing conceptions of
human rights in the light of present-day African societies and argues that
traditional African conceptions of human rights have particular rele-
vance to African societies, and merit greater consideration than they are
presently given.
No single document can represent a blueprint of the full content of
"human rights." This is because the substance of "human rights" de-
pends on the cultural setting of a particular society. Moreover, specific
human rights doctrines interrelate with prevailing socioeconomic struc-
tures. Present conceptions of human rights which are interpreted in the
major United Nations and other international human rights documents
are based upon Western standards of human rights and are intellectually
and historically derived from that period of history now commonly re-
ferred to as "the enlightenment."
It is not sufficient to argue that present conceptions of human rights
reflect an ideology different than that which Africa acknowledges; it is
necesary to explain the massive violations of human rights which persist
on the African continent. To some Westerners the African continent
conjures up images of widespread torture and massacres of people.
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Sadly, this is characteristic of much of Africa, as is -the deliberate neglect
of large numbers of people left to languish in poverty and starvation.
Most of these abuses are objectionable in terms of Africa's own tradi-
tional conceptions of human rights. In condemning the many atrocities
one should therefore condemn them in terms of Africa's own standards.
In this way it will be easier to achieve a consensus on what constitutes
"fundamental rights" based not on foreign standards but on standards,
customs, ethics, and practices indigenous to African societies.
Finally, this Article considers the future of human rights in Africa
in light of the recent drafting of the African Charter of Human and Peo-
ple's Rights ("African Charter"). The African Charter represents an Af-
rican conception of human rights. The strength and weaknesses of the
African Charter will be analyzed in considering the future of human
rights in Africa.
II. THE NOTION OF HUMAN R[GHTS IN
HISTORICAL FOCUS
The term "human rights" as it is commonly used today is a twenti-
eth century concept for what was referred to as natural rights or the
rights of man.' Its legal and philosophic foundations can be traced back
to developments in England, France, and the United States from the sev-
enteenth to the eighteenth century. The seventeenth and eighteenth cen-
turies were times of radical economic and social transformations through
which the capitalist system came into existence.2 Consequently, it was a
period of changing societal values in parts of Europe and North
America.' The bonds of feudalism were being gradually eroded and a
new industrial class came to the forefront. The emerging capitalist class
found itself constrained by the communal and restrictive nature of the
feudal system.4
A. The Emergence of Individual Rights in the Struggle
Against Feudalism
Given these constraints, it became inevitable that the emerging capi-
talist class would rebel against these limitations and demand greater
1. See M. CRANSTON, WHAT ARE HUMAN RIGHTS? 1 (1973).
2. See HUMAN RIGHTS CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERU;PECTIVES 2 (A. Pollis & P.
Schwab eds. 1979) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES].
3. Id."
4. See J.D. VAN DER VYVER, HUMAN RIGHTS THE CAPE TOWN CONFERENCE 11
(1979) (Van Der Vyver attributes the notion of human rights as an outcome of the conflict
against the despotic Stuart Kings).
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political participation and political freedom for all.5 Through various
philosophic writings found in the works of Locke, Montesquieu, and Jef-
ferson among others, the ideas of individual rights and popular sover-
eignty gained acceptence.6 In 1776 in Virginia, a bill of rights was
adopted at a convention of delegates representing the thirteen original
states,7 which stated that all men are equally free and independent by
nature and in possession of certain inherent rights of which they cannot
be divested, namely the right to life, liberty, and property.' The United
States Declaration of Independence9 reiterated these values and the
United States Constitution' ° defined these rights in greater detail. In the
new social order the dominant philosophical doctrine was the conception
of each human being as an autonomous individual possessing inherent
rights." This provided an explanation of and legitimizing currency for
the new social order. 2 These emerging, radical notions were soon em-
bedded in the respective legal systems through the English Petition of
Rights, 3 the United States Declaration of Independence, 4 and the
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. 5
These inherent rights, termed "natural rights," were said to be supe-
rior to those of any sovereign state1 6 and therefore were not to be linked
to any political institution. These early documents and models provided
the standard rights which were later adopted into the constitutions of the
various states; for example, rights to security, liberty, ownership of prop-
5. See CJ. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND DEmOCRACY 6 (1968).
6. See L LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GovERNMENT (P. Laslett rev. ed. 1963) (3d ed.
1698); JJ. ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSE ON THE ORIGIN OF INE-
QUALrrY (L.G. Crocker 1967) (Ist ed. 1762); and C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE
LAWS (D.W. Carrithers ed. 1977) (Ist ed. 1748).
7. Kenyon, Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America in CONSTlTUTIONALISM 85, 93
(I.E. Pennock & J.W. Chapman eds. 1979).
8. The Virginia Declaration of Rights, adopted in Virginia on June 12, 1776. For a copy
of the text of the declaration, see M. PALUMBRO, HUMAN RIaTS MEANING AND HISTORY
142 (1882).
9. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
10. As the first ten amendments the Bill of Rights became part of the United States Con-
stitution on Dec. 15, 1791.
11. Wright, Human Rights in the West: Political Liberties and the Rule of Law, in
HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPEcTIvEs, supra note 2, at 20.
12. Id.
13. See R.P. STERN, PAGEANT OF EUROPE 235-39 (1948).
14. See The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
15. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. For a copy of the Declaration, see
The Era of the French Revolution, ANvn. No. 22. (L. Gershoy trans. 1957).
16. This embodies the notion of natural rights. See Locke, An Essay Concerning the True
Original Extent and End of Civil Government, in SOCIAL CONTRACT, ESSAYS BY LOCxE,
HUmE AND ROUSSEAU 73 (E. Barker trans. 1960).
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erty, and the right to resist oppression. 17 The notion of a fundamental
tension between the individual and the state was reflected in these early
documents.18 The possession of natural rights constituted a barrier
between the individual and the government. To ensure that the govern-
ment did not penetrate this barrier, advocates of natural rights devised
mechanisms to limit the government with regard to the individual. The
more important of these mechanisms were the theory of separation of
powers and the notion of the rule of law to guarantee protection of each
individual's natural rights." Hence, Western political systems produced
institutional arrangements in such a way as to ensure that the essential
natural rights (human rights) were not infringed upon by the
government.
B. Are There Universal Elements in Present Conceptions
of Human Rights?
The English author Maurice Cranston asserts that human rights are
universal.20 He defines human rights as universal moral rights, some-
thing which all men everywhere, at all times ought to have and "some-
thing of which no one may be deprived without grave affront to
justice,"" something which is owing to every human being simply be-
cause he is human. Cranston premises the claim of universality mainly
upon a view that human nature is essentially the same everywhere.22
There are strong arguments against such broad generalizations of
human nature. In the social sciences, the realist school argues against
considerations of rights and principles and asserts that an analysis of the
facts and science of government is needed to explain how governments
and people actually behave.23 Those who adhere to the view of cultural
relativism argue that there are crucial differences in the political cultures
of different societies. For example, Muslims would assert that the very
concept of natural rights is absent from their traditions.24
17. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amends. I - X.
18. See L.. MACFARLANE, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS 7 (1985).
19. HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 20.
20. See M. CRANSTON, supra note 1, at 1.
21. Id. at 68.
22. I at 7; see J. DONNELLY, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 8 (1985).
23. See Bozeman, Law, Human Rights, and Culture, in THE MORAL IMPERATIVES OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 26-27 (K.W. Thompson ed. 1980) [hereinafter MORAL IMPERATIVES]; see
also J.A. RICHARDS, MENCIUS IN THE MIND: EXPERIMENTS IN MULTIPLE DEFINITION 80
(1932).
24. See HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN NEEDS AND DEVELOPIiG NATIONS: A BELLAoIO
CONFERENCE (JUNE 26-30, 1979) 6 (M. Richardson ed. 1980) [hereinafter BELLAGIO
CONFERENCE].
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It becomes crucial therefore to consider whether all the rights con-
tained in the United Nations human rights documents are valid every-
where and at all times. Some scholars criticize such notions of
universality, and argue that the Charter of the United Nations, and the
Universal Declaration are based on the philosophies of a Western polit-
ical system, and therefore provide only a particular conception of human
rights.25 The Universal Declaration is particularly strong in its emphasis
on notions of political liberty and weak in the area of economic, social,
cultural, and group rights.26
The rights laid out in the Universal Declaration and later in the
European Convention of Human Rights (European Convention) are not
in any way a consequence of the developement of these two documents.
In the United States and Western Europe the idea of human rights, con-
ceived in the individual, was adopted and became very much a part of the
political culture of these societies over three centuries. The experiences
of World War II and the practices of Nazi Germany prompted the draft-
ing of the Universal Declaration.27 As a result, a particular political ori-
entation was manifested in the Universal Declaration. This orientation
conceptualizes human rights as a liberal system of values.28 The Univer-
sal Declaration reiterates these natural law principles with their ideologi-
cal underpinnings and values.29 This may be one reason that the
Universal Declaration has not reached its objective of achieving a con-
sensus on human rights.
Moreover, when we consider the drafting of the document and its
adoption in 1948 we find there were very few African or so-called "third
world" countries with membership in the United Nations at that time.3"
The last two-and-a-half decades have marked the entry of independent
African and other "third world" countries into the United Nations and a
consequent change in the organization's emphasis.31 The cultural orien-
25. See A.H. ROBERTSON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 3-4 (1982).
26. Article 25 of The Universal Declaration specifies that everyone has the right to a
decent life but does not call on the state to ensure or work towards the attainment of a decent
life. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA. Res. 217 (1i), 3 U.N. GAOR at 71, U.N.
Doe. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
27. See J.P. HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT AD-
VENTURE 12 (1983). See also M. PALUMBRO, supra note 8, at 12.
28. See E. SCHWELB, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 12
(1964).
29. The Provisions of the Universal Declaration are conspicuous in their repeated empha-
sis on individual rights without mention of group rights. See Universal Declaration, supra note
26.
30. At the time the Universal Declaration was drawn up there were only three independ-
ent Black African countries: Ethiopia, Liberia, and Egypt.
31. H. TOLLEY, JR., THE U. N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (1987).
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tations and priorities of these new nations were different from those of
the Western nations. The subsequent covenants and conventions of the
United Nations to some extent reflect these new orientations.32
The constitutions of most independent African countries were ini-
tially modelled on, and embodied principles taken from, the constitutions
of the colonial powers and the Universal Declaration. 33 For many Afri-
can countries acceptance of the constitution drafted by the colonial
power was a prerequisite for achieving independence. 34 Admittedly,
most African governments have accepted the United Nations Charter
and the Universal Declaration. 35 However, to argue that acceptance of
the United Nations documents by many African governments is an indi-
cation of universal standards, would be merely legalistic and would fail
to consider wider factors such as the circumstances surrounding the
adoption of the constitution, the culture, and the needs of the popula-
tion. 36 If the latter view is adopted, then our conception of human rights
will accommodate political, economic, cultural, and social issues.
Western writers, such as Cranston, criticize the International Cove-
nants which they consider to go beyond this conception of universal
rights. 37 This emphasis on economic and cultural rights are, according
to their test, neither essential nor universal. Such views are indicative of
the parochial nature of human rights thinking. Human rights are looked
at purely from the ideological standpoint of the speaker and are con-
ceived only as the achievement of civil and political rights.38
Since the 1960s, when the United Nations membership began to
change, its definition of human rights has broadened. 39 The African
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights continues this progression,
stressing African peoples' rights to economic, social, and cultural devel-
opment.' While western countries value civil and political rights, Afri-
32. Id.
33. Baldwin, Constitutional Limitations on Government in Mexico, the United States, an4
Uganda, in COMPARATIVE HUMAN RIGHTS 79, 85 (R.P. Claude ed. 1976).
34. See F.A.R. BENNION, CONSTrtUTIONAL LAW OF GHANA 69, 75-76 (1962) (quoting
Parl. Deb., Official Report, Vol. 12 at 5).
35. See Kannyo, The OAUand Human Rights, in THE OAU AFrER TWENTY YEARS 157
(Y. EI-Ayouty & I.W. Zartman eds. 1984) [hereinafter OAU and Human Rights].
36. See HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 7.
37. See M. CRANSTON, supra note 1, at 68-69.
38. See id.
39. There is greater emphasis on economic, cultural and social rights as is indicated In the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Covenant on Economic and Social Rights].
40. See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, adopted June 1981, preamble,
para. 8, OAU Doe. CAB/LEG/67/3/REV.5 [hereinafter African Charter].
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can states emphasize economic and social rights."1
This is not to dismiss everything embodied in the Universal Declara-
tion and the United Nations Covenants. All societies, be they modem or
traditional, manifest some notion of human rights in that certain aguably
essential values are upheld.4 2 However, the way these values (which
some prefer to call rights) are conceptualized differ. In many regards the
Universal Declaration is universal in intent but not in derivation. 43 It
contains certain provisions which are respected in all societies and cul-
tures. For example the right to life and the right against torture seem to
be universally accepted.4" While some societies do not adhere to the
above values, no society, custom or religion condones torture or arbitrary
deprivation of life.45 To this extent it is arguable that the right to life and
the right against torture are universal. Similarly, traditional African soci-
eties respected freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of
movement, and the right to property.' However, the way these rights
are conceptualized marks the fundamental point of departure between
these latter rights, found in traditional African societies, and the way
they are presented in the United Nations documents.
C. Traditional African Conceptions of Human Rights
All societies, traditional or modem, manifest notions of human
rights. The way in which these rights are conceptualized, however, var-
ies across different cultural settings.47 Traditional African societies had a
system of law comparable to Western legal systems with one major ex-
ception. In most traditional African societies the law existed outside the
framework of a state in the modem sense.48 Obedience to the law was
maintained through custom and religion as well as established patterns of
sanction. These pre-colonial African societies had a high level of organi-
zation in which political, economic, and social control was maintained.4 9
Unfortunately, some Western scholars disparage customary law, or
the traditional patterns of maintaining social control, because it is influ-
41. See A.H. ROBERTSON, supra note 25, at 12-13.
42. See Berger, Are Human Rights Universal?, COMMENTARY, Sept. 1977, at 62.
43. See Legesse, Human Rights in African Political Culture, in MORAL IMPERATIvES,
supra note 23, at 123.
44. See HuMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 15.
45. See Berger, supra note 42.
46. See Welch, Human Rights as a Problem in Contemporary Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS
AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 16 (C.E. Welch & RI. Meltzer eds. 1984) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA].
47. See Berger, supra note 42.
48. O.C. EzE, HUMAN RIrG=S IN AFRICA SOME SELECTED PROBLEMS 10 (1984).
49. Id.
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enced by religion, custom or magic. 50 This approach fails to distinguish
between how customary law works in practice and how the laws were
derived.51 Even natural law principles of human rights, which form the
basis of Western conceptions of human rights, contain so-called "inher-
ent rights" which are derived from a supreme being and have religious
overtones.52
Most tradtional African societies had a sense of justice and were
remarkably democratic in that all members of the group participated in
the decision-making process.53 The rights to life and security were essen-
tial as were the elaborate mechanisms and procedures for making deci-
sions.54 Integral to the African understanding of human rights was the
concept of group or community; the group was seen as more important
than the individual.55 Moreover, the traditional African conception of
human rights was humanist in orientation.56
In the community, decisions were made for the benefit of the group
and were achieved by consensus. The core of African societies was
egalitarian in character and the economic benefits achieved were shared
by the group.58 This is not to say that there were no discrepancies be-
tween different members of the group. However, there were mechanisms
to ensure that individuals did not deviate so much from the norm so as to
overpower the other members of society.59
50. See Mojekwe, Self Determination the African Perspective, in SELF DETERMINATION:
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS 223 (Y. Alexander ed. 1980).
51. See generally C.P. POTHOLM, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AFRICAN POLITICS
25 (1976).
52. See F.O. AWOGU, POLITICAL INSTITUIONS AND THOUGHT IN AFRICA: AN INTRO-
DUCTION 47 (1975).
53. See Beattie, Checks on the Abuse of Political Power in Some African States: A Prelimi-
nary FrameworkforAnalysis, in COMPARATIVE POLITICAL SYSTi.MS 355, 361-73 (R. Cohen &
J. Middleton eds. 1967). Beattie selects four traditional African societies in different parts of
the continent and identifies various social institutions that restrain the abuse of political power.
The conformity to these norms are built into the political institutions and act to circumscribe
the actions of the ruler. For example, a leader must first act on the advice of his council or else
he may be fined or deposed. In some societies when the leader departed from established
norms, subjects could refuse customary economic services, revolt or have the chief deposed.
54. See Asante, Nation Building & Human Rights in Emergent African Nations, 2 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 72, 73-74 (1969).
55. See M'Baye & Ndiaye, The Organization of African Unity (CA U), in 2 THE INTERNA-
TIONAL DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 588 (K. Vasak ed. 1982).
56. See K. KAUNDA, A HUMANIST IN AFRICA 24-25 (1966).
57. See 0. ODINGA, NOT YET UHURU 12 (1967).
58. See F.O. AWOGU, supra note 52, at 83.
59. See Legasse, Human Rights in African Political Culture, in MORAL IMPERATIVES,
supra note 43, at 125.
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President Kaunda of Zambia describes the practice of African
humanism:
The tribal community was a mutual society. It was organized to sat-
isfy the basic human needs of all its members... individualism was
discouraged.... Human need was the supreme criterion of behaviour
... social harmony was a vital necessity.... [Cihief and tribal elders
... adjudicated between conflicting parties... and took whatever
action was necessary to strengthen the fabric of social life.60
In reference to human rights in indigenous society and its position
today, Peter Schwab and Admantia Pollis state:
... [I]ndividuals still perceive themselves in terms of their group iden-
tity.... The concept of an autonomous individual possessed of inher-
ent, inalienable rights has been meaningless .... Regardless of the
particular traditional cultural patterns and the specific social relations,
the individual has been perceived as an integral part of a group within
which he or she has a defined role or status... and if the concept of
rights has any relevance, it is derived from relations with others.61
Hence, in traditional societies the individual was not viewed as
standing apart or alienated from the society. The individual enjoyed a
great number of rights and duties.62 These rights and duties, however,
were enjoyed through or within the society, of which the individual was
only a part.63 Within the framework of the group, the individual enjoyed
freedom of expression, freedom of religion, freedom of movement, free-
dom of association, the right to work, and the right to education."
Traditionally, to be part of the extended family was considered a
fundamental right.6" A person who failed to conform to the norms of the
society lost his or her status and no longer enjoyed the protection of the
social unit.66 Freedom of thought, speech, and beliefs were considered
common communal rights.67 They were, however, subject to one qualifi-
cation, namely the "principle of respect." Marashinge states that this
concept of respect involved both a respect for oneself and for others.68
The individual members of society recognized and respected the position
60. K. KAUNDA, supra note 56, at 24-25.
61. HuMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 16.
62. See F.O. AwoGu, supra note 52, at 82.
63. Id.
64. See M'Baye & Ndiaye, supra note 55, at 589-91.
65. See Welch, supra note 46.
66. Id.
67. See Marashinge, Traditional Conceptions of Human Rights in Africa, in HUtfAN
RIGHTS IN AFPiCA, supra note 46, at 37.
68. Id.
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and rights of other members. The degree of respect varied according to
age, ability, and sex.69 This respect towards others did not constitute
merely the morals of the society but, as Marashinge states, it was very
much a part of the normative structure of the legal system,70 and deter-
mined the extent to which freedom of speech could be expressed. 71 The
limitations imposed on freedom of speech aimed to preserve the common
fabric of the society.7 2 It is arguable from an African perspective that
this is similar to the limitations imposed in "modern" day society.71
The enjoyment of wealth and property also occurred within the col-
lective framework. Traditional African societies generally distributed
their wealth evenly and provided security for all members of the
society.74
All members in society had to work for their living. Idleness was
almost nonexistent. For instance, to be classified as a loiterer carried a
social stigma.75 Though the society's elder was custodian of the wealth, 76
the group did not work for the elder. The elder did not possess the
wealth personally, but only held it as a custodian because of his greater
age.7 7 Traditional African societies deferred to old age because the elders
had served the society in their youth. The elder's prestige and power was
not enhanced by the wealth he held for the community. As an example
of the democratic nature of the system, if the elder in any way abused his
position or squandered the wealth, he could be removed.78
Traditional African societies did not include a leisured class of land
owners since land was viewed as community property.79 Thus article 17
of the Universal Declaration, which states that everyone has the right to
own property and is interpreted to mean that every individual has the
69. See J. NYERERE, UIAMAA-ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM 107 (1968) [hereinafter EssAYS ON
SOCIALISM].
70. Marashinge, supra note 67, at 37. The point made is that although the law existed as
custom outside the framework of the state, it still effectively regulated the actions of its mem-
bers. See O.C. EzE, supra note 48.
71. Marashinge, supra note 67, at 37.
72. Id.
73. Even in the United States and Britain, freedom of speech is supressed when it is shown
to lead to public inconveninence, annoyance, or unrest. See D.C. KRAMER, COMPARATIVE
CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 34-39 (1982).
74. See F.O. AWOGU, supra note 52, at 82.
75. See ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM, supra note 69, at 5.
76. Id. at 4.
77. Id.
78. See Beattie, supra note 53, at 361-70.
79. See HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 8-9.
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right to own property, is at odds with traditional African conceptions. 80
In traditional African societies the individual had the right to use the
land to produce food for himself and his family, but the right did not
extend beyond this."' Moreover land was not a marketable commodity. 2
African humanism viewed a person in his or her totality as opposed
to dissecting him or her into various elements.83 To concentrate on one
or a few aspects of a person, and neglect others, is to upset the traditional
balance of viewing a person in the totality.84 Thus, approaches to human
rights which consider only economic goals, or political or civil rights, are
not in keeping with African traditions.
African humanism contributes to humanitarian law. Fasil Nahum
emphasizes the extent of African humanism in war and stresses that Af-
rican wars never resulted in complete destruction.85 This sense of hu-
manity is illustrated in the unwritten rules by which wars were fought.
For example, fighting started in the morning and ended at sundown.
Furthermore, war ceased entirely during the ploughing and harvesting
seasons.8 6 Moreover, only men were involved in war and cruelty to en-
emy casualties and prisoners was not permitted.
7
D. Major Difficulties in Implementing Western Institutions and
Conceptions of Human Rights in Africa
Several writers maintain that societies can and do undergo cultural
transformation. Rhoda Howard argues that African societies have been
culturally transformed so as to make Western conceptions of human
rights applicable in Africa. 8 This notion of cultural transformation is
worth examination.
Colonial rule curtailed much of the traditional African freedoms
and practices in the name of improving and bettering Africans. 9 How-
ever, the colonial powers did not allow classical Western concepts of
80. Article 17 states that everyone has the right to own property alone as well as with
others. Universal Declaration, supra note 26, art. 17.
81. See ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM, supra note 69, at 7.
82. Id.
83. See Nahum, African Contributions to Human Rights (May 24-28, 1982) (unpublished
paper presented at the seminar on Law and Human Rights in Development, Gaborone, Bot-





88. See R.E. HOWARD, HuMAN RIGHTS rN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 16 (1986).
89. See K.A. BusLA, AFRICA IN SEARCH OF DEMOCRACY 48-49 (1967).
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human rights to be assimilated into the African life-,tyle. 90 Instead, co-
lonial rule applied to the indigenous African population standards which
differed from classical liberal traditions.9
The period of colonialism was one in which scant respect was paid
to human rights in Africa. 92 Western notions such as the right to vote
and the right to participate in the political process were nonexistent.93 In
addition, colonial rule eroded traditional forms of participation. Tradi-
tional rulers were relegated to a position in which they were no longer
representative of the population and were used to further colonial ends.94
The overall effect was to undermine traditional institutions without en-
abling Western ideas to take root.9"
The colonial powers arbitrarily drew the colonial borders. Thus at
independence, many of the new states consisted of several heterogeneous
tribes.96 Within this framework, and in the context of economic and so-
cial chaos, 97 many governments in newly independent Africa had to em-
phasize the forging of national unity9" in an effort to develop an identity
of nationhood beyond ethnic or tribal parameters. " The significance of
this task is evident in the light of what John Steward Mill referred to as
prerequisites for a Western type democratic state:
Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of differ-
ent nationalities. Among people without fellow-feeling, especially if
they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion nec-
essary to the working of representative government cannot exist. The
influences which form opinions and decide political acts are different in
the different sections of the country.... It is in general a necessary
condition of free institutions that the boundaries of government should
coincide in the main with those of nationalities."co
90. Asante, supra note 54, at 100.
91. Id. at 100-01.
92. See id. at 100.
93. HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 8.
94. L. RUBIN & B. WEINSTEIN, INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN POLITICS A CONTINENTAL
APPROACH 218-19 (1977).
95. See Mojekwe, supra note 50, at 223-24.
96. E. KANNYO, HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 11 (1980). For
a detailed discussion of the way the borders of African countries were drawn see 1. BROWNLIE,
AFRICAN BOUNDARIES A LEGAL AND DIPLOMATIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1979).
97. The point is often made that colonial rule was inimical to the process of nation build-
ing. B.O. NWABUEZE, CONSTrUTONALISM IN THE EMERGENT STATES 12-13 (1973) [here.
inafter CONSTIruTIONALISM].
98. See generally I. WALLERSTEIN, AFRICA THE POLTICS OF INDEPENDENCV (1961).
99. See Id at 88.
100. JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENT[ATIVE GOVERNMENT, 230-
33 (1958).
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When one considers the European Convention, it is easier to appre-
ciate why its institutions work so well. The European countries in the
European Economic Community (EEC) have come to share a common
set of values.10 1 With a consensus on a set of values it is easier to formu-
late agreements and to submit issues before a common court-in the case
of Europe, the European Court of Justice-the authority of which all the
members respect."°2 The problem in Africa is not only the difficulty of
building a consensus between different states; African countries have to
first achieve national unity. Without cohesion and a sense of national
identity it is difficult to achieve national consensus. Ernest Baker, writ-
ing about England, argued that the nation has to be the basis of a state if
there is to be general social cohesion.10 3 The sense of nationhood acts as
a matrix solidifing the population. If there is no sharing of a common
tradition and sentiment, it cannot be held together. If the state attempts
to assert authority when there is no common tradition or sentiment, ten-
sions and divisions, similar to those experienced by the Austro-Hun-
garian Empire, are likely to emerge."
Over a period of time, the concepts and principles of individualism
and constitutionalism in the United States and the countries of the EEC
have become embedded in the traditions of these societies.105 To trans-
plant these notions and structures into the African situation is to ignore
the cultural and other realities of Africa.106
This argument is not meant to advance the cause of traditional insti-
tutions as a solution to the problems of African government. However,
reformers must take note of the institutional arrangements, which in
most instances were modeled along the lines of the departing colonial
power, and must question whether the constitution serves its purpose as
an instrument for pursuing happiness. Karl Loewenstein warned of the
consequences of imposing a constitution:
The new constitutions will find it difficult to integrate themselves in the
minds of the people. They mean next to nothing, or very little, to the
little man ground between the nether and the upper millstones....
The constitutions are indifferent toward the realities of the life of the
people, incapable of satisfying the minimum of social justice and eco-
101. Namely their belief in liberal capitalism. See supra text accompanying notes 1-4.
102. BELLAGGIO CONFERENCE, supra note 24, at 19.
103. E. BARKER, PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 3, 43, 55 (1951).
104. See generally id.
105. See Lofchie, Representative Government, Bureaucracy and Political Development: The
African Case, 16 AFR. ADMIN. STUD. 132 (1982).
106. See Gupta, Political Systems and the One Party State of Tropical Africa, 31 INDIA Q.
160 (1975).
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nomic security that the common people believe themselves entitled to,
the pretentious bills of rights notwithstanding.... The constitutions
cannot, and do not bridge the gap between poverty and wealth....
The people distrust their governments, their officials, their parties and
parliaments, and their constitutions. 107
Most constitutions in Africa were drawn up by the colonial powers
before the countries became independent. ioa In many instances the colo-
nial powers modeled African constitutions on their own. 10 9 Moreover,
an African elite, who had received colonial and missionary education,
were at the forefront of many independence struggles. 110 Some of these
leaders were not only receptive to Western values but considered West-
ern systems worthy of emulation.111 The protections afforded by the in-
dependence constitutions were designed, in some cases, to protect
expatriate Europeans. 112 Indigenous Africans were not consulted in the
process of writing the independence constitutions which, not surpris-
ingly, reflected the assumptions and interests of the departing powers.113
The cultural transformation argument is thus difficult to accept in a
context where authortarian colonial rule prevented political participation
and Western notions of individual liberty and democracy were stifled.
E. Alternative Approaches to the Promotion of
Human Rights in Africa
When looking at the future of human rights in Africa, particularly
those rights considered fundamental, a rethinking of current approaches,
in light of the philosophical differences between Western liberal thought
and traditional African societies, is necesary. Although major differences
exist, there are common features which these societies share. There is,
therefore, a compelling need to first disentangle current fundamental no-
tions of human rights from particular ideologies and to conceptualize
them in terms of a common denominator.1 1
4
107. Loewenstein, Reflections on the Value of Constitutions in Our Revolutionary Age, in
COMPARATIVE POLmcs at 161 (H. Eckstein & D.E. Apter eds. 1968).
108. See CONSITUTIONALISM, supra note 97, at 23.
109. See OAU and Human Rights, supra note 35, at 10.
110. See CONSITrUTIONALISM, supra note 97, at 26-27.
111. See A. MAZRUI & M. TIDY, NATIONALISM AND NEW STATES IN AFRIcA FROM
ABouT 1935 TO THE PRESENT 31-43 (1984).
112. See Southern Rhodesia, The Zimbabwe Constitution Order 1979 § 38(1)(a). Even as
late as 1979 when negotiating Zimbabwe's independence from Britain, there was an insistence
on protection for the minority white population. Twenty parliamentary seats were reserved for
the white population, quite disproportionate to their numbers.
113. See E. KANNYo, supra note 96, at 10.
114. See Berger, supra note 42.
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Traditional African societies showed great respect for human dig-
nity. Today this is referred to as African humanism." 5 No traditional
African societies permitted torture, killings or detention of its mem-
bers." 6 Torture, killings, and other abuses would be objectionable in
terms of Africa's own traditional standards of human rights. Difficulties
arise, however, when human rights theories are framed in a form which
require African countries to accept replicas of western governments and
notions of individualism and natural law. 7 Flexibility is needed to ac-
cept African conceptions of human rights as valid expressions of such
rights.
Traditional systems of law and the values underlying them are
mechanisms intrinsic to each society. While colonial rule succeeded in
destroying African political institutions, it was unsuccessful in destroying
African traditional political values and ideas." Therefore the attain-
ment of human rights such as the right to life, right against torture, free-
dom of movement, and the right to participate in political decisions will
best be enhanced by promoting conceptions of human rights located in
the particular society's customs and laws.
The form of human rights provided in this context should derive
from a set of values common to members of a particular society and
which are essential in maintaining the fabric of that society.1 9 The con-
cept of individual land ownership, for example, should no longer be per-
ceived as a universal right. 120 In a society where there is a perception
that land belongs to all the people in common, it would be legitimate for
the land to be developed for the benefit of all the people.' 21 Moreover,
where traditional patterns do not permit a class of landed wealthy to
develop, it is legitimate to promote equality according to standards ac-
ceptable to that people's way of life."2 Hence, the concept of equality
applied to Africa has as to be analyzed beyond conventional western
115. See K. KAUNDA, supra note 56, at 24-25.
116. See generally Welch, supra note 46.
117. See Mojekwe, International Human Rightr The African Perspective, in INTERNA-
TIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTEMPORARY IssuEs 85-95 (J.L Nelson & V.M. Green eds.
1980).
118. Mazrui, The Cultural Faith of 4frican Legislatures: Rise, Decline and Prospects for
Revival, 112 PRESENCE AFmCANE 26 (1979).
119. See Marashinge, supra note 67, at 32.
120. Cf Orwin & Pangle, The Philosophical Foundation of Human Rights, in HuMAN
RIGHTS IN OUR TIME 6 (M.F. Platther ed. 1984). The authors emphasize that the right to
accumulate private property is at the heart of the original notion of human rights. Private
property is viewed as an institution allowing the expression of every person's labor.
121. See 0. ODINGA, supra note 57, at 13.
122. Id.
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thinking; a context in which the individual's equality does not necessarily
have to be promoted apart from that of the rest of society. In Fasil Na-
hum's description of African societies he states: "To the ancient question,
am I my brother's keeper, the answer is an emphatic yes, and so is your
brother your keeper! In traditional African societies every value is
shared both good and bad." 123
It follows that the promotion of human rights could include the pro-
motion of cooperative values and working together for the benefit of the
community. Nyerere's discussion of Tanzanian society called for a revi-
sion of the educational system to inculcate in the younger generation the
skills and values needed and cherished in their own society. 124 The colo-
nial education system, in contrast, was designed to serve colonial inter-
ests and reflected values consistent with this purpose.1 25 Moreover,
equality could be perceived as a factor in reorganizing society so that the
intellectually and physically stronger members of society exercise their
strength for the benefit of all. 126
In a modem setting one can argue that the s'tate has replaced the
tribe or clan, that issues that once belonged to the tribe or clan now are
national issues, and that it would be consistent for past group identities
to be replaced by an allegiance to the state.127 The role of the state in
Africa, particularly considering Africa's economic plight, cannot be
viewed in negative terms but needs to be seen as a positive institution
through which human rights along with other economic and develop-
mental goals can be achieved. 121
The notion of democracy too has to be considered in a broader and
more flexible manner to allow for methods of participation in the deci-
sion-making process which go beyond the casting of periodic votes. This
calls for a recognition of the fact that the manner and form of participa-
tion can vary in the context of different societies.""9 Democracy in the
traditional African setting entailed participation in society's social and
economic institutions and extended beyond electing a head of state or
local representative. 30 The manner and extent of participation should
123. Nahum, supra note 83.
124. ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM, supra note 69, at 52.
125. See id.
126. Id.
127. HuMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES, supra note 2, at 11-12; R;SAYS ON SOCIALISM, supra
note 69, at 85.
128. Economic deterioration is a major factor for military interventions in African states.
See Baker, Reflections on the Economic Correlates of African Democracy, in CONSTITUTION-
ALISM & DEMOCRACY 53, 59 (D. Ronen ed. 1986).
129. See R. HINDEN, AFRICA AND DEMOCRACY (1982) 7-8 (Encounter Pamphlet No. 8).
130. ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM, supra note 69, at 171.
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take account of the African reality and the needs of the population. For
example, the former Portuguese colony of Guinea Bissau, like most Afri-
can countries after independence, was left in an impoverished and un-
dereducated state. In the entire country, the Portuguese had built only
one school.' The leadership of the country orientated its goals towards
the needs of the country. Due to the country's very limited resources,
the leadership consulted the people and allowed them to make a choice
as to whether they wanted a school or a clinic, both of which were
needed.' 32 This illustrates a form of grass roots democracy and repre-
sents a simple solution geared towards the needs of the people.
Similarly, Tanzania has established village councils which possess
considerable power over local affairs.133 Each village elects its own mem-
bers to serve on the village council.134 All the people decide how the
village is to be run and the village council is only there to implement the
mandate given to it by the people. 35 This system of participation is
based on traditional forms of participation.
The foregoing discusssion is not meant to elevate traditional institu-
tions to serve as a model frameworks to be emulated in African societies.
It merely highlights a specific concept of human rights, the notion of
democracy and participation, in terms of Africa's traditional values.136
The institutions which exist to implement democracy and human rights
can vary across different societies at different times.
To a jurist for example, the problem in Africa is that of determining
the kind of jurisprudence and institutional arrangements appropriate for
African societies.1 37 Factors relevant to this question include the values
of the community, the history of African societies, and the lessons
learned from the introduction of different institutional arrangements in
Africa. 13
8
Africa has accepted the geographical definitions of nations imposed
by the colonial powers. 1 39 Previously, traditional African institutions re-
volved primarily around the family, clan or lineage which constituted the
131. See BELLAGIO CONFERENCE, supra note 24, at 56.
132. Id.
133. See J. NYERERE, FREEDOM AND SoCIALIsM, UHURu NA UJAMA: A SELEcnoN




136. See R. HmD,, supra note 129.
137. See C. OGwuRwx, CONCEPT OF LAW IN ENGLISH SPEAKING AFRICA 7 (1979).
138. Id.
139. African leaders, though they all emphasize the arbitrary nature of their borders, have
done nothing to redraw their boundaries since independence. See R.B. NEUBERGER, CON-
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basic unit of organization. With the emergence of a nation state, there
needs to be a transfer of allegiance from the old to the new institutions.
Traditional institutions would be, in many instances, incompatible with
such a transformation. 140 In this respect, traditional practices should be
abandoned to the extent that they interfere with the process of nation
building. 141
Western institutions were not allowed to take root in Africa in the
colonial period. At the same time, African institutions were de-
stroyed.142 This institutional vacuum does not mean that ideas cannot be
drawn from other societies and systems to the extent that they enhance
African values. Indeed some African countries have attempted to inte-
grate traditional African law with institutional ideas received from for-
eign legal systems. For example both Zambia and Tanzania have
followed the Scandinavian system and introduced the institution of an
ombudsman. 143
Overall, the promotion and protection of human rights will be facili-
tated by recognizing that there are aspects of human rights which ema-
nate solely from a Western perspective. There are also certain notions of
human rights on which there could be a broad consensus. The worst
incidents of human abuse such as torture, detention, killings, enslave-
ment, forced removals, and other forms of persecution are issues on
which there is a consensus. This agreement is not limited to the Western
perspective. 1 "
F. Human Rights Abuses in Post-colonial Africt
The African continent today is rife with torture, brutality, murder,
and other gross violations of human rights objectionable by any standard
of judgment. 145 The protections that traditional societies afforded their
members are conspicuously absent today. Part of the reason for these
CEPTS OF NATIONHOOD IN THE THOUGHT OF SELECTED AFRICAN LEADERS 211-14 (1980)
(available on microfilm at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor).
140. See R. LEDDA, SOCIAL CLASSES AND POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN AFRICA, reprinted
from August 1967 issue of INT'L SOCIALIST J., 568-70 (1967).
141. The process of nation building has been defined as a process of bringing the people
together. See F.O. AWOGU, supra note 52.
142. The point is repeatedly made that colonial rule was of an authoritarian nature, See
Y.P. Ghai, Constitutionalsim and the Political Order in East Africa, in DAR ES SALAAM IN-
AUGRAL LECTURE SERIES 10, at 28-29 (University College Dar Es Salaam 1970).
143. For a review of the role of ombudsman in Tanzania, see Oluyede, Development
Through Silent Grievances in Tanzania, 6 E. AFR. L. R v. 31 (1973).
144. See Berger, supra note 42, at 62-63.
145. See OAU and Human Rights, supra note 35, at 157; see also 0. AWOLOMO, THE
PROBLEMS OF AFRICA THE NEED FOR IDEOLOGICAL REAPPRAISAL 70 (1977).
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human rights violations can be attributed to the abject economic and
social conditions which prevailed in Africa at the end of the colonial
era.'" These conditions constrain nations from achieving social and eco-
nomic rights. 47 However, this historical explanation cannot be used as a
permanent excuse.
After independence, the governments of many African countries
eliminated Western type multi-party political systems and replaced them
with one-party systems or military dictatorships. 148 The one-party presi-
dential system was justified as being better suited to the needs and cir-
cumstances of African societies. 149 There are two major and somewhat
contrary justifications put forward for a one-party state: (1) the people
were unanimous in their approval of a one-party state,150 and (2) the
one-party state was presented as the best political framework to heal the
wide cleavages and achieve national unity in African societies.15 1
The one-party system was projected as compatible with democracy
and as a creative way of dealing with the problems of Africa. 1 2 It was
projected as consistent with traditional African ways of settling problems
in a consensual fashion, as opposed to the adversarial model of Western
systems.' 53 In some instances the one-party system was projected as a
return to traditional lifestyles.'5 4 While consensus politics was charac-
teristic of African customs, in present day Africa the emphasis on tradi-
tional values is used selectively. Often, politicians use traditional values
as a pretext to fortify a party or individual in political office. This misuse
of traditional values has led in some cases to the creation of presidents
for life, as in The Central African Empire and Malawi, or other forms of
dictatorship. 55 On the path towards this goal some African nations
146. See L.G. COWAN, THE DILEMMAS OF AFRICAN INDEPENDENCE, 6-7 (1964).
147. Id.
148. See P.F. GONIDEC, AFRICAN PoLrTcs (1981).
149. B.O. NWABUEZE, PREsiDENTIALSM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA, 89 (1974).
150. See J. Nyerere, Speech to the National Assembly (June 8, 1965), reprinted in FREE-
DOM AND SOCIALISM, supra note 133, at 36. (He also claimed that the approval of a one-party
state was manifested by the overwhelming support for the Tanganyika African National Union
[T.A.N.U.] Party).
151. In other countries such as Ghana, Uganda, and Zambia, the justification for a one-
party state was based on the lack of overall national unity which often resulted in violence.
S.A. DE SMITH, THE NEw COMMONWEALTH AND ITS CONSTITUTION 233-34 (1964). A.
MAZRUI, CULTURAL ENGINEERING AND NATION-BUILDING IN EAST AFRIcA 287 (1972).
152. See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURIST, HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE-
PARTY STATE (1978).
153. See R. HINDEN, supra note 129, at 2.
154. See P.F. GONIDEC, supra note 148, at 148.
155. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1979 12-13,
24-25 (1979).
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have used widespread imprisonment, torture, coercion, and detention. 15 6
In other instances, political leaders used the emphasis on traditional life-
styles to mask the decay and practices of despotic regimes. This has oc-
curred in Zaire and Uganda." 7
What we see with the demise of colonial rule is the achievement of
political independence and the replacement of colonial rule with new in-
digenous political elites; in other words, the phenomena of "flag indepen-
dence. '1 58 The masses generally have no voice in political decision
making, which is the sole occupation of the elite.159 These new gov-
erning elites have at times exploited their nation's underdeveloped econo-
mies and ethnic differences to consolidate their own political and
economic base."e Eze states that the new indigenous elite were quick to
use the coercive instruments of the colonial state in the supposed interest
of security, national unity, and economic development.161 With regard
to economic development, the new elite did not use the few available
resources to promote the well-being of the people and overall human
rights, but rather concentrated these resources in their own hands.
1 62
Clearly, the problem of human rights violations cannot be solved by most
African governments which constitute a significant part of the prob-
lem.163 Hence, one witnesses the basic contradiction between African
problems such as poverty, the lack of national unity, and underdevelop-
ment, which impede the implementation of human rights on the one
hand, and the measures which are required to solve the problems on the
other. 164
Unfortunately, the attainment of human rights goals in Africa today
156. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENTS 44-50
(1983).
157. See Ajami, The Fate of Non-Alignment, 59 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 366, 379 (1980-81),
158. See F. FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH 118 (C. Farrington trans. 1963).
159. See A. POLLIS & P. SCHWAB, TOWARD A HUMAN RIGHTS FRAMEWORK 19 (1982).
160. See O'Connell, Political Integration: The Nigerian Case, in AFRICAN INTEGRATION
AND DISINTEGRATION CASE STUDIES IN ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL UNION 181 (A. Hazel-
wood ed. 1967).
161. O.C. EZE, supra note 48, at 229.
162. See Government of Malawi, His Excellency the Life President's Speeches, Malawi
Congress Party Convention, Lilongwe September 3-12, 1971 (Zomba: Government Printer
1971). President H. Banda of Malawi concentrated large tracts of land into his own hands and
boasts of this achievement. See also Republic of Zambia, Report of the Commission of Enquiry
into the Allegations Made by Mr. Justice Chimba and Mr. John Chisata 6-7 (Lusaka: Govern-
ment Printers May 1971) (an example of Zambian Civil servants using credit schemes, created
to aid local farmers, to acquire large tracts of land).
163. See B. DAVIDSON, WHICH WAY AFRICA? THE SEARCH FOR A NEW SOCIETY 111
(1971). The way governments conduct themselves only exacerbates the problems of poverty
and lack of national unity. See supra text accompanying notes 156-157.
164. See R. DUMONT, FALSE START IN AFRICA 81 (1966) (The author notes that civil
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depends to a great extent on the caliber of each country's leadership, the
political philosophies of the ruling party, and its commitment to funda-
mental principles of human rights. 6 ' Ex-President Nyerere of Tanzania
sums up the problem facing Africa by stating that there must be an over-
all acceptance of human equality.1 66 This is a call for leaders who have
the commitment to serve the purposes and needs of the masses along
traditional lines. The absence of such commitment, honesty, and ac-
countability leads to corruption and the abuse of human rights.1 67 To
effect accountability there must be an adequate institutional framework,
the precondition for which has not yet developed. 168
The promotion of national unity is a legitimate concern for most
African countries in the face of tribal, ethnic, and other forces dividing
these new nations and threatening their survival. Protection of a political
system is a legitimate concern of all governments. 6 9 It can become diffi-
cult, however, to distinguish between an action taken to protect the in-
tegrity of the system, and an action taken to protect a particular
government.170 In Africa many governmental actions are prompted by
the need to secure the government's survival, particularly when political
decisions are made by the ruling elite.171
The argument for a one-party state, as a means of achieving stability
and development, is compelling. However, government should not use
problems of instability and underdevelopment as an excuse to consolidate
their own position or that of a political or economic elite. Governments
must solve these problems in a democratic way. If a one-party state is
going to be consistent with traditional democracy, then the participation
of everyone in the party's decision-making process is necessary. Under-
developed countries should allow the masses to participate both in deci-
sion making and in the implementation of projects.' 72 Moreover, a one-
party state created in the name of promoting development is untenable if
servants in the Cameroun and Senegal earn more in less than two months than a peasant earns
in a lifetime in the same country.).
165. See I. WALLERSTEIN, supra note 98, at 94-95.
166. ESSAYS ON SOCIALSM, supra note 69, at 89.
167. See P.F. GONIDEC, supra note 148, at 28.
168. See Rivkin, The Role of Institution-Building in Africa, in NATIONS BY DESIGN: IN-
STITUTION-BUILDING IN AFRICA 6, 17 (H. Morrow ed. 1984).
169. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE-PARTY STATE, supra note 152, at 27.
170. Id.
171. See CONSTrrUTIONALiSM, supra note 97, at 222.
172. N.M. SHAMUYARIRA, Individual and Group Rights in a One-Party State." Some Reflec-
dons on the Tanzanian Experience, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE-PARTY STATE, supra note
152, at 102.
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the major recipients of the supposed development are the ruling elite. 173
Within the structure of a one-party state there has to be consensus,
and the masses must contribute towards the achievement of this consen-
sus. 74 They must be able to criticize the way the projects are carrded
out. Moreover, the officials responsible for carrying out tasks must, in
order to prevent corruption, be accountable via the party to the masses.
Karal Vasak and Keba M'Baye introduced the phrase "[t]he right to
development" into current human rights discourse.175 This right, how-
ever, can be said to have had prior recognition at the international level,
and to be implicit in the United Nations Charter,' 76 the Universal Decla-
ration,177 and in the International Covenants.1 71 There still exists, how-
ever, a debate on how the right to development should be formulated.1 79
The common and distorted approach is to view development in economic
terms as the achievement of modernization and high levels of economic
growth.180 In Africa many governments selectivly emphasize cultural
characteristics (like peace loving nature, traditional respect for authority,
and obedience) to facilitate their control over their people and to pro-
mote goals in terms of a narrow definition of development. 81
Presenting economic development as requiring a tradeoff is in
vogue. According to this view rapid growth can only be achieved by
imposing an iron-fisted government and limiting the political participa-
tion of the population.18 2 Proponents of this perspective assert that eco-
nomic development should be accorded the highest priority while
political participation has to be sacrificed. 3
This argument fails to recognize that economic developement and
173. For examples of corruption and uneven access to resources, see I.L. MARKOVITZ,
POWER AND CLASS IN AFRICA 201-15 (1977).
174. See id. at 294.
175. Keba M'Baye, a Sengalese lawyer, played a leading role in promoting the right to
development as a human right. See his delivery at UNESCO meeting of experts on Human
Rights, Human Needs, and the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, Paris,
June 1978, 19-23, UNESCO Doe. SS 78/Conf. 630.8.
176. U.N. CHARTER arts. 55, 56.
177. Universal Declaration, supra note 26, arts. 22, 28.
178. Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, supra note 39, art. 1; International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter Cove-
nant on Political Rights].
179. See Meltzer, International Human Rights and Development, in HUMAN RIOITS IN
AmRCA, supra note 46, 208-23.
180. See L.G. COWAN, supra note 146, at 16.
181. See R.T. Nhlapo, Limitations on Human Rights: The Cultural Argument (May 24-28,
1982) (unpublished paper presented at Gaborone Seminar), supra note 83.
182. See Huntington, Political Modernization: America vs Europe, in WORLD POLIrICS 378,
410 (1966).
183. See CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 97, at 164, 168.
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human rights are not mutually exclusive, but rather are opposite sides of
the same coin. The object of development should be the removal of ob-
stacles inhibiting human potential. This necessitates that governments
work toward the removal of all forms of domination and allow individual
and collective imagination to identify goals and create and adopt ways to
achieve those goals.1 84 There is a symbiotic relationship between devel-
opment and truly democratic participation reflected in the fact that de-
velopment calls for participation of everyone in political, economic, and
cultural affairs.18 ' Development is not purely the achievement of eco-
nomic growth nor the strengthening of the government. One aspect of
development cannot be stressed at the expense of other aspects. The eco-
nomic tradeoff argument goes against the lessons of African humanism
because it attempts to dissect people, ostensibly to achieve an economic
person.'8 6 Human rights should be viewed holistically. The traditional
balancing of the political, economic, and cultural life should be main-
tained. In the words of Professor Vojin Dimitrijevic:
There can be no either-or thinking in this realm. The moment one
human right, or group of rights, is sacrificed for the attainment of
some other, more 'important' or 'essential' human right, whenever
freedom is opposed to equality or material well-being, the structure of
universal values is undermined: at the end there is neither bread nor
liberty.' 8 7
I. THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HUMAN AND
PEOPLE'S RIGHTS: STRENGTHS AND
WEAKNESSES IN PROMOTING
HUMAN RIGHTS
It took many years for human rights practices in independent Africa
to be placed on the agenda of the Organization of African Unity (OAU).
During the 1960s and 1970s African governments devoted greater atten-
tion to dismantling colonialism and safeguarding their newly acquired
independence.' 88 These governments paid very little attention to domes-
tic human rights practices with the notable exception of the OAU's con-
184. See UPPSALA, DEVELOPMENT DIALOGUE 73 (1981).
185. See A. Dieng, A Synopsis of the Dakar Seminar on Development and Human Rights
(May 24-28, 1982) (unpublished paper presented at Gaborone Seminar), supra note 83.
186. See 0. SILVEIRA, AFRICA SOUTH OF THE SAHARA PARTY SYSTEMS AND IDEOLOGIES
OF SOCIALISM 124 (1976).
187. Dimitrijevic, Development as a Right (May 24-28, 1982) (unpublished paper
presented at Gaborone Seminar), supra note 83.
188. See CA U and Human Rights, supra note 35, at 159.
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demnation of the practices of the white government in South Africa. 189
Apart from this, African governments generally have viewed repression
and violent changes of government and other forms of abuses as matters
falling within the domestic jurisdiction of each country. 190 Article III of
the OAU Charter states:
The Member States, in pursuit of the purposes stated in Article II,
solemnly affirm and declare their adherence to the following principles:
1. the sovereign equality of all Member States;
2. non-interference in the internal affairs of states;
3. respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each State
and for its inalienable right to independent existence; 191
Member states have constantly invoked this section to prevent other
member states from interfering in the affairs of QAU countries, even in
cases of gross violations of human rights.19
In the late 1970s certain developments in Africa changed this situa-
tion. First, there was wide-scale publicity of the massive killings, torture,
and other gross transgressions committed by Macius Ngema in Equato-
rial Guinea, Idi Amin in Uganda, and Jean Bedel Bokassa in the Central
African Republic.193 All three dictators presided over their respective
countries in a brutal fashion and were responsible for the deaths of
thousands. Despite these large-scale violations, the OAU did not for-
mally consider the human rights abuses in these countries. It was not
until Tanzania invaded Uganda in 1979 that the OAU seriously dis-
cussed human rights at a summit conference in the Liberian capital,
Monrovia. 194 These deliberations finally culminated in the drafting of
the Banjul Charter on Human and People's Rights known as the African
Charter. 195
The African Charter is an important development in the promotion
of a regional initiative to advance and protect human rights in Africa.
The adoption of the African Charter marks a cautious departure from
the hitherto domestic jurisdiction rule and towards a recognition that
189. See HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 20.
190. See OAU and Human Rights, supra note 35, at 162.
191. Organization of African Unity Charter, art. 3, 479 U.N.T.S. 39 (1963) [hereinafter
OAU Charter].
192. See Umozurike, The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the O.A. U. Charter, 78 APR. Av-
FAIRS 197-209 (1979).
193. See, eg., S. CRONJE, EQUATORIAL GUINEA, THE FORGOTrEN DIcTATORSHIP
(1976); AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, POLITICAL KILLINGS BY GOVERNMENTS, supra note
156, at 44-49.
194. Kannyo, The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis and Political
Background, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA, supra note 46, at 144-47.
195. See preamble, African Charter, supra note 40.
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issues of human rights concern all African nations. 196 The African Char-
ter represents Africa's outlook. The drafters of the African Charter pur-
posefully created a document on human rights that takes into account
African legal philosophy and African needs. 197
A. Preamble
The African Charter consists of a preamble and three parts.
Although some lawyers may argue about the legal force of a preamble,
the preamble to the African Charter provides valuable insight into the
Charter.
Paragraph three of the preamble refers to the Charter of the OAU
and identifies as essential objectives "freedom, equality, justice, and the
legitimate aspirations of the African peoples.' 98
The preamble alludes to the pledge in the OAU Charter to remove
all forms of colonialism from Africa and to coordinate efforts to achieve
a better life for the peoples of Africa. 199 Furthermore, the preamble reaf-
firms the OAU Charter's commitment to promote international coopera-
tion as manifested in the Charter of the United Nations and the
Universal Declaration.2' The most noteworthy aspect of the preamble
is its emphasis on historical tradition and the values of African civiliza-
tion, which it states should provide inspiration in reflecting on the con-
cept of human and people's rights.2"1 This emphasis on traditional
African values represents a significant departure from other international
human rights documents.
The second striking aspect of the preamble is the perception that the
enjoyment of human rights also entails duties. 2z Previously, most
human rights issues were concerned with duties owed by the state to the
individual. For the first time the African Charter articulates duties owed
by the individual to the state.2 °0 This clause is consistent with African
traditions which hold that each individual owes a duty to the
196. See OAU and Human Rights, supra note 35, at 162; OAU Charter, supra note 191,
art. 3.
197. See preamble, African Charter, supra note 40.
198. Id. para. 3.
199. Id. para. 4.
200. lId; see Universal Declaration, supra note 26.
201. African Charter, supra note 40, at para. 5.
202. Id. para. 6.
203. Id. para. 7. None of the other important human rights documents, including the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Convention of Human Rights, nor the
American Convention of Human rights have such a duty provision.
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community.2°4
Paragraph nine of the preamble stresses the right to development
and links civil and political rights with economic, social, and cultural
rights.
[I]t is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to
development and that civil and political rights cannot be disassociated
from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as
universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural
rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights.205
The above provision is ambiguous as to whether civil rights and eco-
nomic rights go hand-in-hand, or whether economic rights are a prereq-
uisite for the enjoyment of civil and political rights. The final part of the
preamble answers this ambiguity by stressing the importance the African
Charter attaches to traditional freedoms and rights.2 °6 The African
Charter thus clarifies that economic and political rights are inextricably
linked.
Finally, the preamble mentions some of the problems that Africa
has to overcome, namely apartheid, neocolonialism, foreign military ag-
gression, and discrimination of various forms. All these problems must
be tackled if the African Charter is to promote and protect human rights
in Africa.2 °7
B. Part I, Chapter 1: Rights
Part I of the African Charter sets out rights and duties of member
states. Although there are some differences, many of the substantive pro-
visions of the Charter are similar to the provisions found in other inter-
national human rights documents such as the Universal Declaration and
the two United Nations Covenants.208
Article 1 of the African Charter not only calls on member states to
recognize the rights and duties enumerated in the African Charter, but
unlike the United Nations human rights documents, implores member
states to adopt legislative and other measures to give effect to these rights
and duties.20 9 Article 2 entitles every individual to the rights and free-
204. M'Baye, in HUMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS IN AFRICA AND THE AFRICAN CHARTER
27 (International Commission of Jurists 1986).
205. African Charter, supra note 40, at para. 8.
206. Id. at para. 10.
207. Id. at para 9.
208. This is consistent with previous conclusions that certain values are universal, though
they may be conceptualized differently. See supra text accompanying notes 50-87.
209. African Charter, supra note 40, art. I.
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doms recognized in the Charter without discrimination as to "race, eth-
nic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other opinion,
national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status."2 0 Article 2,
read in conjunction with article 1, imposes a duty on member states to
ensure the principle of non-discrimination. However, the above two pro-
visions read together are inconsistent with the provisions in articles 11,
12, and 13, which qualify the enjoyment of many rights by subjecting
them to the local laws of member states.211 Many countries, for example,
clearly limit the rights of individuals engaged in political activities
outside the mainstream political party.2 12
Part I spells out a host of rights similar to those included in the
United Nations documents, such as the right to life and the prohibition
of torture.213 This is fully consistent with our previous classification of
these rights as fundamental and universal. It is encouraging to note that
the prohibition of torture is stated in absolute terms: "torture, cruel, in-
human or degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited. 21 4
Article 7 contains due process provisions, including the right to trial, the
right to counsel, and the prohibition of ex post facto laws.215 Later pro-
visions give clear expression to socio-economic and cultural rights, such
as the right to work,216 the right to health,21 7 and the right to
education. 18
In light of article 1, the question is whether governments are re-
quired to provide rights, such as legal counsel for an accused person.
The right to education, health, and work is a reiteration of the provisions
in the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(International Covenant).21 9 The International Covenant does not place
a positive obligation on member states to implement these rights, but
merely calls on them to progressively realize the rights enumerated in the
International Covenant."2 By contrast, the African Charter obligates its
member states to implement the socio-economic rights - a difficult task
210. Id. art. 2.
211. Id. arts. 11, 12(1), 12(2), 13(1).
212. This is particularly the case in one-party states where people excluded from the party
find it difficult, if not impossible, to engage in political activity. See generally 0. ODINGA, Supra
note 57.
213. African Charter, supra note 40, arts. 4, 5.
214. Id. art. 5.
215. Id. art. 7.
216. Id. art. 15.
217. Id. art. 16.
218. Id. art. 17.
219. See Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, supra note 39, arts. 6, 11, 12, 13.
220. Id. art. 2; Covenant on Political Rights, supra note 178, art. 2.
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given the critical economic and underdeveloped condition of most Afri-
can countries.
Article 9 specifies that every individual has the right to receive infor-
mation.221 This right makes a progressive departure from other human
rights documents, and marks the inclusion of what are referred to as
"third generation" rights.222
The African Charter also provides for the right to free association,
freedom of movement, and the right to assembly, subject to the individ-
ual's abiding by the law and subject to the necessary restrictions provided
for by the law.223 The phrases "provided he abides by the law' 224 and
"subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by law'" 225 are prob-
lematic and unfortunate inclusions. They indicate that in the area of
human rights most African governments have not completely moved
away from the domestic jurisdiction principle.226 In many African coun-
tries, one man or a ruling elite controls the law. To promote human
rights by reference to the law of the land is therefore fallacious. What
the law of the land is and how the law of the land is derived must be
made clear. The masses must know who is responsible for running the
country and who is responsible to the people. The provisions, as they
stand, gloss over some of these problems. Thus, in their present form
they could conceivably be read to condone the practices of autocratic
regimes.
The African Charter provides for the right to participate in the gov-
ernment of the country.227 Unlike the provisions of other international
human rights documents, the way in which people may exercise this
right is not defined in terms of one person, one vote or universal adult-
hood suffrage. Instead the relevant article is phrased broadly to read that
representation should be through direct or freely chosen representatives
in accordance with the provisions of the law.228 The African Charter
correctly emphasizes the need for participation. Hopefully, member
states will not interpret the phrase "in accordance with the provisions of
the law" as permitting the existence of nondemocratic structures.
221. African Charter, supra note 40, art. 9(1).
222. For a discussion of third generation rights, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LEGAL AND POLICi ISSUES 99 (T. Meron ed. 1984).
223. African Charter, supra note 40, arts. 10, 11, 12.
224. Id art 10.
225. Id art 11.
226. This is the notion that member states should not intervene in the internal affairs of
other states. See OA U and Human Rights, supra note 35, at 162..63; see also OAU Charter,
supra note 191, art. 3(2).
227. African Charter, supra note 40, art. 13(1).
228. Id.
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The body of the African Charter also lists problems which member
states must overcome and goals they must attain in order to realize
human rights; namely, self determination, freedom from foreign domina-
tion, freedom from foreign exploitation, and the right to economic, so-
cial, and cultural development. 229 In the area of political participation,
dictatorships, presidents for life, military oligarchies, and their variations
are "modem" problems and constitute as much of an impediment to the
full realization of human rights in Africa as does economic injustice.2 0
Although the African Charter is correct in not prescribing the form that
political participation should take, the promotion of human rights would
be enhanced by an unequivocal condemnation of dictatorships and elite
rulers.
The African Charter guarantees the right to property" 1 although in
this arena it significantly departs from the United Nations human rights
documents. In the African Charter property is not specifically guaran-
teed to individuals.232 Thus, this provision incorporates traditional con-
ceptions of community ownership of property.
Article 18, in keeping with the African tradition, mentions the fam-
ily as the natural unit and basis of society. More significantly, article 18
departs from traditional patterns by requiring the states to eliminate all
forms of discrimination against women. 33 In this regard it affirms its
belief in the pronouncements of international declarations and conven-
tions.2 34 This is a positive development that reflects a growing consensus
in Africa that discriminatory practices against women should be
eradicated.
The African Charter provides for the independence of the courts as
well as the establishment and improvement of appropriate national insti-
tutions to promote human rights and freedoms. 35 However, the African
Charter also should have made allowance for indigenous institutions,
such as customary law and traditional dispute settlement mechanisms . 6
229. Id. arts. 20, 21, 22.
230. See B. DAVIDSON, supra note 163, at 111; F. FANoN, supra note 158.
231. African Charter, supra note 40, art. 14.
232. The Universal Declaration in article 17 calls for the right to own property individually
and in association with others, Universal Declaration, supra note 26, art. 17.
233. African Charter, supra note 40, art. 18(3).
234. Id.
235. Id. art. 26.
236. In many parts of Africa today there are two systems of jurisdiction. The first system
is based essentially on what was inherited from the colonial power, while the second is based
on either Islamic or African customary law. In the case of African customary law a council of
elders, tribal or religious, will exercise jurisdiction over a matter. These traditional institutions
are more significant than the inherited courts, particularly in the rural areas, in the role they
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Overall, it appears that the drafters of the African Charter saw the inde-
pendence of the courts as an essential restriction on state parties.237 Ob-
viously, in countries with dictatorships, or those that do not adhere to
the notion of judicial independence,238 it is not possible for the judiciary
to fulfill its function in an impartial manner.239 However, some one-
party states adhere to the principle of an independent judiciary, although
they call for this independence to be exercised in relation to the overall
national goals of the country."4° Julius Nyerere, former President of
Tanzania, states that the judiciary's "interpretation must be made in the
light of the assumptions and aspirations of the society in which they live.
Otherwise their interpretation may appear ridiculous to that society, and
may lead to the whole concept of law being held in contempt by the
people."241
The impartiality of judges, even in western political systems, is an
ongoing debate.242 In the United States, judges are. appointed or elected
through party politics. 243 In England judges are appointed in recognition
of their services to the party.244 Despite attaining office through partisan
politics, upon election the judicial officer assumes a position of neutral-
ity." It is unrealistic, however, to ignore Western judges' individual
socialization and history and to argue that judges remain aloof from poli-
tics. 46 These factors influence the way judges view legal matters. A the-
oretically neutral judicial officer unaffected by what is going on around
him is a practical impossibility. 7 President Nyerere's statement calls on
judges to actively identify with a political viewpoint.248 This is a matter
to which African jurists should give greater consideration. The meaning
play in the lives of the population. Van Doren, American Customary Law, 36 AM. J. CoMP. L,
332 (1988); International Commision of Jurists, A Report on the Proceedings of the African
Conference as the Rule of Law 135 (1961).
237. Id.
238. For developments in this regard in Ghana under Nkrumah, see Rivkin, supra note
168, at 127.
239. For example, Togo abolished the principle of independeno of the judiciary in favor of
having the judiciary function as ordinary civil servants.
240. See P.F. GONIDEC, supra note 148, at 215.
241. FREEDOM AND SOCIALISM, supra note 133, at 112.
242. See R. MILLIBAND, THE STATE IN CAPITALIST SOCIETY 138-41 (1969); Wacks,
Judges and Injustice, 101 S. A-R. L.J. 266 (1984).
243. Id
244. Id.
245. See P.T. GEORGES, The Court in the Tanzania One-Party System, in EAST AFRICAN
LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE 29 (G.F.A. Sawyerr ed. 1967).
246. See P.T. Georges, The Role of Judges and Magistrates in a One-Party State, in
HUMAN RIGHTS IN A ONE-PARTY STATE, supra note 152, at 55.
247. See B.O. NWABUEZE, JUDICIALISM IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 139 (1977),
248. See generally ESSAYS ON SOCIALISM, supra note 69.
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of impartiality of the courts should be clarified by the envisaged
commission. 249
1. Part I, Chapter 2: Individual Duties
Chapter 2 of Part I consists of three articles listing the duties of the
individual to the family, community, and state.250 Individuals must exer-
cise their duties to the family and society and enjoy their rights and free-
doms with due regard to the rights of others, the common interest, and
morality." 1 This is consistent with the way rights and freedom were
enjoyed in traditional African societies. The provision of article 29 is
indicative of the present conditions in Africa. The article states:
The individual shall also have the duty:
1. To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to
work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his
parents at all times, to feed and help them in case of need;
2. To serve his national community by placing his physical and
intellectual abilities at its service;
3. Not to compromise the security of the state whose national or
resident he is;
4. To preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity, par-
ticularly when the latter is threatened;
5. To preserve and strengthen the national independence and
the territorial integrity of his country and to contribute to its
defense in accordance with the law;
6. To work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to
pay taxes imposed by law in the interest of the society;
7. To preserve and strengthen positive African cultural values in
his relations with his fellow beings and in his relations with
society, in the spirit of tolerance, dialogue and consultation,
and in general to contribute to the promotion of the moral
well-being of the society;
8. To contribute to the best of his abilities, at all times and all
levels, to the promotion and achievement of African unity.2 s2
Osite Eze emphasizes that the duty provisions reveal matters of ba-
sic concern to Africa; for example, underdeveloped economies and the
lack of social security. These conditions force families to provide social
249. This would be in terms of the mandate given to the Commission under the African
Charter, supra note 40, art. 45; see also text accompanying note 257 infra.
250. Id arts. 27, 28, 29.
251. Id. art. 27(2).
252. Id art. 29.
1989]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
security.253 Moreover, the duty provisions emphasize the need to pro-
mote indigenous culture while still building a sense of nationhood and
achieving development goals.2"'
The duty provisions, however, lack specificity. For example, it is
difficult for the state to invoke the African Charter and successfully es-
tablish that an individual is not performing his duties to the best of his
abilities and competence.215 Likewise it would be difficult for the state to
prove whether the individual is acting to preserve and strengthen positive
African cultural values.256 It is therefore questionable whether the above
provisions intend to impose specific duties on the individual because they
are not justiciable, although the values they try to promote are consistent
with traditional practices.
C. Part II, Safeguarding Rights
Part II of the African Charter sets out the measures envisaged by
the African Charter to safeguard people's rights. Chapter 1 envisages the
establishment of an African Commission on Human and People's Rights
(Commission). Chapter 2, article 45 deals with the mandate of the Com-
mission and states:
The functions of the Commission shall be:
1. To promote Human and Peoples' rights and in particular:
(a) to collect documents, undertake studies and researches on
African problems in the field of human and peoples' rights,
organize seminars, symposia, and conferences, disseminate
information, encourage national and local institutions
concerned with human and peoples' rights, and should the
case arise, give its views or make recommendations to
Governments.
(b) to formulate and lay down, principles and rules aimed at
solving legal problems relating to human and peoples'
rights and fundamental freedoms upon which African Gov-
ernments may base their legislations.
(c) to co-operate with other African and international institu-
tions concerned with the promotion and protection of
human and peoples' rights.
2. Ensure the protection of human and peoples' rights under
conditions laid down by the present Charter.
253. See O.C. EzE, supra note 48, at 215.
254. See id.
255. See African Charter, supra note 40, art. 29(b).
256. See Id. art. 29(7).
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3. Interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the
request of a state party, an institution of the OAU or an
African organization recognized by the OAU.
4. Perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government.- v
It is clear that the Commission's functions are primarily promo-
tional, and do not include decision-making powers." 8 Unlike the Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights, the Commission is not an
independent decision-making body charged to protect human rights?5 9
Rather, it is always accountable to the Assembly of Heads of State and
Government (The Assembly).26°
Chapter 3 of Part II lays out the procedure the Commission should
follow.2 6' The Commission has wide latitude and can "resort to any ap-
propriate method of investigation. ' 262 This allows the Commission to
conduct investigations on its own and to act as a watch-dog over human
rights abuses. The African Charter provides for two forms of communi-
cations. The first is communication by a member state.263 A member
state which has good reason to believe that another state party has vio-
lated a provision of the African Charter may, by means of a written com-
munication, notify the violating state, the Secretary General of the OAU,
and the Chairman of the Commission of the alleged violation.2 ", The
offending state is required to provide a written explanation to the report-
ing state within three months of the complaint.265 If within three months
the reporting state and the offending state do not settle the matter, either
party has the right to submit the matter to the Commission. 66
257. African Charter, supra note 40, art. 45.
258. This is clearly spelled out in article 45 which deals with the Commission's mandate.
259. The European Convention on Human Rights not only imposes legal obligations on its
members but also provides a procedure for securing compliance with its provisions. Any
breach of Convention provisions may be brought to the attention of the European Commission
of Human Rights. The Commission, through consultation with the parties concerned, may
attempt a conciliation and failing an amicable settlement, the Commission reports to the Com-
mittee of Ministers. The latter body could prescribe remedial measures against the non-com-
plying government. Alternately, the case may be brought to the European Court of Human
Rights within three months after the Commission issued its report. The decision of the Euro-
pean Court is binding on all member states. European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
260. African Charter, supra note 40, arts. 45(4), 59.
261. Id. arts. 46-59.
262. Id. art. 46.
263. Id. art. 47.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. art. 48.
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The African Charter, however, contains a unique provision which
also entitles a member state to submit a complaint directly to the Chair-
man of the Commission, the Secretary General of the OAU, and the state
concerned.267 It does not, however, detail the circumstances under
which such direct communications can be made. One can only speculate
that the latter provision was included to allow flexibility in cases of gross
violations of human rights. It is not specifically expressed in this way,
however, which indicates the continued utility of the domestic jurisdic-
tion principle.268 The domestic jurisdiction priniciple's strength is rein-
forced in article 50 which states that the Commission can only deal with
a matter after all local remedies are exhausted.2 69 There is an exception
to article 50 which allows the Commission to proceed when it becomes
clear "that the procedure of exhaustion of these remedies would be un-
duly prolonged. '2 70 This requirement is vague and leaves it open as to
whether there is a fear that human rights violations would be prolonged
or a fear that domestic remedies may be lengthy and drawn out.
Articles 52 and 58 emphasize the need for members of the African
Charter to attempt to negotiate a solution to human rights problems.2 71
The approach of talking things over and arriving at a solution is consis-
tent with the African tradition of dispute settlement.272 The wisdom of
such an approach, however, in a case of gross violations of human rights
is questionable.
If the parties fail to reach an amicable solution, the Commission
must prepare a report of its findings to the state concerned and to the
Assembly.2 73 The Commission may further provide recommendations to
the Assembly if deemed useful.274
The African Charter contemplates a second form of communication
from nonparties such as individuals. 2 75 The provisions of this section are
similar in substance to those of the United Nations Optional Protocol
which allow for complaints from individuals.276 However, in the case of
a communication by a nonparty the Commission will vote whether to
267. Id. art. 49.
268. See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
269. African Charter, supra note 40, art. 50.
270. Id.
271. Id. arts. 52, 58.
272. See M'Baye, supra note 55, at 27.
273. African Charter, supra note 40, art. 52.
274. Id. art. 53.
275. Id. art. 55.
276. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec,
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 302.
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consider the matter or not, provided that the communication meets cer-
tain criteria as specified in article 56.
When it appears to the Committee, after deliberations, that one or
more communications reveal a series of gross violations of human rights,
the Commission is required to notify the Assembly of these abuses.2"
The Assembly may then request the Commission to conduct an in-depth
study of these cases and report back to the Assembly."' The African
Charter states that all measures taken within its provisions should re-
main confidential until the Assembly decides otherwise.27 9 The confiden-
tiality requirement has drawbacks and negates the recognition that all of
Africa has an interest in human rights violations occuring on the conti-
nent. Evidence shows that adverse publicity has resulted in states de-
sisting from objectionable human rights practices. 280 Although there is
no guarantee that adverse publicity will cause African states to desist
from committing human rights violations, it is imperative that Africa's
silence on human rights abuses be broken and abuses be exposed and
condemned in unison.
D. Part II, Chapter 4, Harmonizing the African Charter with Other
Declarations on International Human Rights
Chapter 4 of Part II of the African Charter spells out the applicable
principles upon which the Commission may draw in condemning human
rights abuses. The relevant sections read as follows:
Article 60
The Commission shall draw inspiration from international law on
human and peoples' rights, particularly from the provisions of various
African instruments on human and peoples' rights, the Charter of the
United Nations, the Charter of the Organization of African Unity, the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, other instruments adopted by
the United Nations and by African countries in the field of human and
peoples' rights, as well as from the provisions of various instruments
adopted within the Specialized Agencies of the United Nations of
which the parties to the present Charter are members.
Article 61
The Commission shall also take into consideration, as subsidiary
measures to determine the principles of law, other general or special
277. African Charter, supra, note 40, art. 58.
278. Id. art. 58(2).
279. Id. art. 59.
280. P.K. Amoah, The African Charter on Human and People's Rights: Implementation
Machinery (May 24-28, 1982) (unpublished paper delivered at Gaborone Seminar), supra note
83.
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international conventions, laying down rules expressly recognized by
member states of the Organization of African Unity, African practices
consistent with international norms on human and people's rights, cus-
toms generally accepted as law, general principles of law recognized by
African states as well as legal precedents and doctrine. 281
It appears the Commission has a wide source of law from which to
extract principles. The provisions of article 60 read alone reinforce the
goal of adherence to other international documents such as the Charter
of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration oF Human Rights, and
other United Nations human rights documents. 82 Article 61 mentions
other factors to be taken into account such as rules recognized by mem-
ber states of the OAU, African practices consistent with international
law on human and peoples' rights, and customs and general principles of
law commonly recognized by African states.283 The provisions of article
61 appear to be secondary to those of article 60 in that the principles of
the former are phrased as "subsidiary measures."2 84 This is inconsistent
with the overall tenor and development of the African Charter which is
to develop human rights in Africa based on the historical tradition and
values of African civilization.28 5 The adoption of such diverse principles
allows the Commission greater flexibility in encouaging human rights.
However, there is a drawback to maintaining such an all-encompassing
standard because it evades the difficult goal of providing a clear concep-
tion of human rights. Hopefully, the work of the Commission, when it
comes into existence, will remedy this and provide clear conceptions and
jurisprudence on human rights for Africa. At this critical juncture there
is a compelling need to achieve consensus on what Africans perceive as
human rights and for Africa to work towards such an achievement.
IV. CONCLUSION
"[L]iberalism in practice has often been a cloak for oppression. ' 286
There are many values shared by different societies, and there can be
agreement on many crucial aspects of human rights. At the same time,
however, there are differences as to the philosophical basis of human
rights. These philosophical underpinnings of huma:n rights emanate from
281. African Charter, supra note 40, art. 60, 61.
282. Id. art. 60.
283. Id. art. 61.
284. Id.
285. See id. preamble, para. 5.
286. B. MOORE, REFLEcTIONS ON THE CAUSES OF HUMAN MISERY AND UPON CERTAIN
PROPOSALS TO ELIMINATE THEM 112-13 (1972).
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particular ideological and economic biases. Different cultural and histor-
ical perspectives have defined the concept of human rights, and what
consititutes acceptable state practice differently during various stages of
economic and political development. For example, at particular stages in
history feudalism, slavery, and colonialism were accepted as compatible
with human rights. The notion of human rights has been defined by
those in power according to their own interests. The fact that human
rights came to be conceived of in terms of the individual reflects the vic-
tory of the emerging capitalist class over the restrictive feudal system.
Even today, discussions on human rights in Africa can often be posed in
terms of whose interests the government is protecting.
If African countries are to agree on the crucial aspects of human
rights, they must separate current thinking on human rights from polit-
ical ideology. The focus on human rights in Africa should not be a con-
venient ploy to conceal foreign interests by using the language of political
democracy. This underlines the importance of the right to self-determi-
nation and the right of people to frame human-rights thinking in terms of
their own traditions, cultural orientations, and goals as impressed in the
African Charter on Human and People's Rights.
This Article has not focussed on neo-colonialism and the violation
of human rights in Africa by foreign interests. Nevertheless, the contin-
ued effects of neo-colonialsim leave many African nations susceptible to
economic dependency and foreign manipulation.287 In this context the
idea of human rights is often used as a tactical camouflage to maintain
the status quo and to protect select interests. For example, many West-
ern concerns about human rights deal only with civil and political rights
and ignore the social and economic conditions of people.288 In the West
the right to vote is seen as more important than the right to food and
shelter. The Teheran conference on Human Rights stressed the impor-
tance of economic, social, and cultural rights and affirmed that "[i]n our
day political rights without social rights, justice under law without social
justice, and political democracy without economic democracy no longer
have any true meaning." ' 9
The adoption of the African Charter is a regional response to human
rights concerns and to a large measure reflects the realities of Africa. To
287. See P.F. GoNIDEC, supra note 148, at 69.
288. For example, the United States State Department, in reporting on human rights viola-
tions, only concerns itself with civil and political rights. See M. HAMALENG WA, THE POUT-
iCAL ECONOMY OF HuMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: HISTORICAL AND CONTEIMPORARY
PERSPECTIVES, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL ACTION ix(3), at 25 (1983).
289. Final Act of the International Conference on Human Rights, Teheran, 23 U.N.
G.A.O.R. (1748th plen. mtg.), U.N. Doc. A/CONF, 32/41 (1968).
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this extent the African Charter is indeed a positive achievement. The
rights and duties embodied in the African Charter reflect an all-encom-
passing view of human rights-economic, social, cultural, moral, polit-
ical-and the need for development consistent with the holistic view of
people as reflected in the African tradition of humanism. The African
Charter views individual and collective rights as interlinked; this linkage
is important to achieve development. Finally, the African Charter re-
flects a belief that political rights and economic, social, and cultural
rights are interlinked in the process of achieving their development goals.
The African Charter has limitations. It is not a panacea for the
achievement of human rights in Africa. First, with respect to the Char-
ter itself, present provisions for enforcement are weak.290 Second, the
fall-back clauses-"subject only to necessary restrictions provided for by
law," '291 and "provided he abides by the law, '292 and in accordance with
the appropriate provisions of the law 293-further reduce the efficacy of
the African Charter. The second limitation lies in the socio-economic
condition of most African countries. This makes it impossible for many
countries to fully achieve the socio-economic and cultural rights enumer-
ated in the African Charter. Finally, the socio-economic problems are
perpetuated by the political and economic systems which require
restructuring.
290. The Commission charged with the protection of human rights is not given any binding
powers.
291. African Charter, supra note 40, art. 11.
292. Id. art. 12.
293. See id. arts. 13, 14.
[Vol. 12
